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Mirrored Ambivalence: A Sometimes
Curmudgeonly Comment on the
Relationship between Organization
Theory and Administrative Law
Jerry L. Mashaw
I agree with Peter Schuck that we administrative law teachers have much
to learn from organization theorists, although (perhaps because) their
general perspective often differs from ours. As academic administrative
lawyers we tend to be reformers. We attempt to develop institutions and
modes of operation that honor administrative law's two fundamental pre-
scriptions: "Be reasonablel" and "Play fairl" Moreover, this prescriptive
viewpoint on organizations leads us generally to think of administrative
behavior as motivated by the pursuit of various public welfare objectives. We
may think that "the public interest" is too vague as a statutory command,
but we nevertheless tend to believe that public welfare is the proper objective
of public administration.
Much of the social-science literature on organizations is, on the other
hand, what I shall call "public choice" rather than "public welfare"
oriented. It is concerned with positive theory, or behavioral predictions. And
the hypotheses that organizational theorists have developed to predict
agency behavior tend to view individuals within bureaus, and bureaus them-
selves, as pursuing some strategy for maximizing their own utility. The
output of the administrative process is then an aggregate of these self-
regarding, utility-maximizing actions as shaped or influenced by the partic-
ular institutional structures and decision processes of specific bureaucratic
settings. Organization theory in its positive pursuits may, therefore, tell
.administrative lawyers something important both about why our public
welfare goals are not always realized and about how we might structure
institutions to, mold the self-regarding behavior of bureaus and bureaucrats
to produce public-regarding or general-welfare-enhancing results.
The stage is thus set for yet another fruitful marriage of law and social
science. But, lest this union merely add to the mounting incidence of disap-
pointed expectations and early divorce, we should perhaps look somewhat
more carefully at what organization theory has to offer. If we do, I doubt that
we will cancel the we.?ding. We can indeed learn from observing how social
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scientists interested in organizational behavior frame their empirical ques-
tions and from reading the rich case-study literature that they generate on the
activities of particular organizations. But we may in the the process find that,
as with any close relationship, the primary value lies in what the interaction
teaches us about ourselves.
The Indeterminacy of Positive Theory
The positive theory of organizations, particularly the literature on public
organizations, is highly suggestive, but its empirical results are not really
very encouraging. Economists have been particularly successful in devel-
oping testable models, models in which objective and determinate inputs
and outputs can be correlated. But the reward for their rigor has generally
been to increase suspicion of the predictive power of parsimonious economic'
models. William Niskanen, for example, suggested in an important book
that public bureaus act primarily to maximize their budgets through
monopolistic sales of goods and services to the relevant congressional
committees. l A whole series of negative welfare consequences were said to
flow from this proposition.
Some evidence has been found for the Niskanen thesis.2 Indeed, who
would have doubted that some evidence could be found. Yet the theory has
been shown to be deeply flawei!,3 and counterexamples abound in the recol-
lections of all of us: the Social Security Administration battling to avoid the
enormous budgetary increases involved in administering the Supplemental
Security Income Program; numerous regulatory agencies adopting "effi-
cient" rule-making techniques that economize drastically on direct budge-
tary expenditures.
Perhaps the most careful testing of a Niskanen-like model is Douglas
Arnold's.4 Building' on the Simon-Lindblom school of microeconomics,
Arnold hypothesized that bureaus are budget stabilizers first, maximizers
second. But Arnold's studies of three programs in which these bureau-
congressional trades would seem predictable, because the programmatic
expenditures are geographically divisible, revealed that his theory could in
the best case explain only 26 percent of the variance in agency budgets. And,
of course, there is no reason to imagine that even these modest results could
be replicated (if the theory could be testedl) in other types of programs.
I should, of course, note that my constrained enthusiasm when'confronted
with these results is not always shared by my social-science colleagues. They
sometimes profess delight when they get solid variance explanations in
empirical tests that creep into the double-digit range. But this is usually not
1. William A. Niskanen, Bureaucracy and Representative Government (Chicago: Aldine,
Atherton, 1971).
2. See William A. Niskanen, Bureaucrats and Politicians, 18 J. L. & Econ. 617 (1975).
3. See, e.g., Jean-Luc Migue & Gerarl! Belanger, Toward a General Theory of Managerial
Discretion, 17 Pub. Choice 27 (1974); Albert Bretan & Ronald Wintrobe, The Equilibrium
Size of a Budget-Maximizing Bureau, 83 J. Pol. Econ. 195 (1975); Julius Margolis,
Comment, 18 J. L. & Econ. 644 (1975).
4. Douglas R. Arnold, Congress and the Bureaucracy (New Haven: Yale Univ. Press, 1979).
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good enough for lawyers trying to predict, in order to mold, the behavior of
specific bureaus. The different predictive demands of lawyers and social
scientists might be succinctly illustrated by the following two graphs
depicting a "good" social-science theory of the relationship between adminis-
trative behavior x and some contingent state of the world y and a "good"
legal theory of the s.ame relationships, tested in relation to the same data.
A "GOOD" SOCIAL-SCIENCE THEORY
x
y
A "GOOD" LEGAL THEORY
x
But do not misunderstand me. We should by no means scoff at the
Niskanen and post-Niskanen literature. For one thing, it focuses our atten-
tion on congressional-bureau relations as an important determinant of
agency behavior; an insight that is hardly novel for a Washington lawyer but
that is virtually ignored by administrative law doctrine and scholarship. For
another, its limited predictive power might caution us concerning the
wisdom of attempting to give a fully determinate shape to administrative
behavior through statutory or doctrinal tinkering. As lawyers we are, I think,
generally much too fond of attempting to draft a statutory or regulatory
solution for every potential oddity in a necessarily evolving administrative
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context. Moreover, the Niskanen-style hypothesis, however apparently
simple minded, specifies a model with objectively measurable variables.
This is a virtue not to be found in virtually any of the other literature on
organization theory-even some of the most insightful of the literature
attributable to economists.5
The organization theory that emerges from the sociological literature, for
example, often provides richer contextualization and more intuitvely plau-
sible hypotheses. But the price is a rather radical indeterminacy in the inter-
pretation of its empirical findings. Michel Crozier's famous "Power moves
to blind spots," for example, may seem apt if "power" means the formal
power to make decisions.6 But if we want to predict how organizations will
. behave, that is, what decisions will be made and how they will be imple-
mented, it is not at all clear that Crozier's aphorism is more than a curiosity.
A fair amount of the literature that Schuck refers to, for example, seems to
contradict Crozier by s~ggesting that the real power to determine the effec-
tive output of policy is at the level where information is most readily avail-
able. Does this suggest the counterhypothesis "Knowledge is power"? Or
does it only suggest that, like "power," the "blind spot" idea is operationally
ambiguous. (Blind to or about what?)'
Nor have political scientists done any better when it comes to producing
either well-specified models or good general predictions. The perennial
favorite, the "iron triangle" of interest groups, congressional committees,
and bureaucracies, simply cannot explain much of the regulatory (or deregu-
latory) behavior of the 1970s.8 Indeed, in the final chapter of "The Politics of
Regulation," James Q. Wilson seems to despair of a behavioral hypothesis
that will provide parsimonious explanation or prediction. So deep is his
perplexity that Wilson makes a suggestion of almost breathtaking naivete,
one that only a Harvard professor secure in his tenure and in his sophistica-
tion could have uttered: perhaps behavior follows ideas. Well, perhaps. But
how would you prove it? And in the postrealist world, how could anyone
entirely believe it?
Again, do not misunderstand me. The literature on organizational theory
is not rendered uninteresting by its lack of testable or of empirically
successful behavioral hypotheses. As I said earlier" there is much to be
learned from its local insights, its "thick description"9 of. the realities of
5. See, e.g., Oliver E. Williamson, Market and Hierarchies (New York: Free Press, 1975);
Armen A. Alchian &: Harold Demsetz, Production, Information Costs, and Economic
Organization, 62 Am. Econ. Rev. 777 (1972); Michael C. Jensen &: William H. Mecklin,
Theory of the Firm: Managerial Behavior, Agency Costs and Ownership Structure, 4 J. Fin.
Econ. 305 (1976) and the literature there cited.
6. Michel Crozier, The Bureaucratic Phe':l0menon (Chicago: Univ. of Chicago Press, 1964).
7. General review, organization, and critique of the sociological literature on organizations
may be found in Charles Perrow, Complex Organizations (Glenview, Ill.: Scott, Foresman
&: Co., 1972) and W. Richard Scott, Rational, Natural and Open Systems (Englewood Cliffs,
N.J.: Prentice Hall, 1981).
8. See, e.g., Michael E. Levine, Revisionism Revised?: Airline Deregulation and the Public
Interest, 44 Law &: Contemp. Probs. 979 (1981).
9. The phrase is Clifford Geertz's. See The Interpretation of Cultures (New York: Basic Books,
1973).
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administration. And there are certainiy, as Schu<;k points out, important
generalizations to be gleaned from both its approach and its empirical detail.
We should not forget that hierarchies are not perfect, that decisions are not
isolated events, that environment matters, that organizations have mainte-
nance needs, and that bureaucrats have professional and individual interests
and ideologies. But we should also not forget, having remembered these
things, that when we are faced with the necessity of attempting to realize in
practice one or another of administrative law's normative prescriptions, we
still do not have a theory of organizations that tells us how to predict the
behavior of bureaus. Social scientific study of organizations can improve,
but will not displace, the lawyer's art.
Implications for Administrative Law
One way that organization theory might improve the lawyer's approach to
administrative law is by making us legal-institution builders appropriately
humble about the state of our own knowledge. For the modest success of
positive organization theory suggests an interesting question: How can we
know that administrative law has any effect, much less the intended effects,
on the behavior of administrative agencies? How can we have a prescriptive
administrative law in the face of positive theory's continuing uncertainty
about how organizations will respond to all stimuli, including norms
purporting to regulate organizational behavior?
There are, of course, a number of ways to answer this question. One way is
to deny its relevance. Realists and materialists from Thurmond Arnold1o to
Murray Edelmanll have viewed administrative law as largely symbolic, a
source of societal comfort or an occasion for rage depending upon the
observer's disposition. Or following one of Roger Noll'sl2 suggestions, we
might imagine that administrative law has great regulative power because it
reflects the culture of the dominant group in federal administrative
agencies-the lawyers. But I am led to a third view-a view in which admin-
istrative law has both symbolic and regulative power but in which generaliza-
tion about behavioral effects is extremely hazardous. Indeed, reflection
suggests that this viewpoint is built into contemporary administrative law.
For, the ambivalence of administrative law doctrine mirrors the ambivalence
of organization theory's lessons concerning the successful design and opera-
tion of organizations.
The Ambivalence of Normative Prescription
Let me begin to explain what I mean by mirrored ambivalence at a lofty
level of abstraction-a level at which organization theory and administrative
law have little more than symbolic significance. Given the indeterminacy of
its positive theory we should certainly expect organization theory to be
10. Thurman W. Arnold, The Symbols of Government (New Haven: Yale Univ. Press, 1935).
11. Murray Edelman, The Symbolic Uses of Politics (Urbana, III.: Univ. of Illinois, 1964).
12. Roger G. Noll, Government Administrative Behavior and Private Sector Response: A
Multidisciplinary Survey (Oct. 1976) (Division of Humanities and Social Sciences, Calif.
Inst. of Technology, Social Science Working Paper, No. 62).
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modest in its prescriptions. That is, indeed, the case. The currently domi-
nant prescriptive approach is contingency theory,l3 a theory that has two
central tenets: (I) there is no best way to design or manage an organization;
(2) all ways of designing and managing organizations are not equally good.
Now before administrative lawyers giggle too openly at these principles
,,~'e should consider for a moment the correspondingly general principles of
administrative law. To reformulate the "Play fairl" and "Be reasonablel"
prescriptions in more nearly doctrinal terms, I think that those general prin-
ciples are these: (1) agency processes and structures must respect individual
rights to fair and rational treatment; (2) individual substantive and proce-
dural rights are limited by the need to effectuate those public purposes that
administrative agencies have in their charge.
Somewhat more concretely, it would appear that many of the more partic-
ular precepts or prescriptions of organization theory and of administrative
law have a similar quality; that is, the ambivalent prescriptions of one
mirror the ambivalent prescriptions of the other. This can perhaps be illus-
trated by contrasting what I will call the "Weberian" and "rilicropolitical"
views of organizations. Both views are well represented in the literature on
organization theory and in the doctrines or practices in administrative law
that correspond to, or seem to seek to implement, these quite different ideas
of how organizations function.
The Weberian Vision
Max Weber, as we all know, believed that the attraction of bureaucratic
organization lay in its capacity for efficient implementation of specified
goals. Bureaucratic efficiency flows from a division of labor into discrete
tasks that can be mastered at a high level of competence and coordinated
through hierarchical supervision. This focus on competence implies that
entry into and promotion within bureaucratic service should be based
wholly on merit criteria that will enhance the efficiency of the bureau.
Similarly, the rules that guide bureaucratic routine will seek to rationalize
the behavior of individual bureaucrats and to ensure that particular deci-
sions or actions contribute to the achievement of the bureau's overall
purposes.. Bureaus are themselves, however, apolitical agents whose purposes
or goals are specified by institutions exogenous to the bureaucratic system
itself.
Many familiar aspects of administrative law mimic or suggest this
Weberian model of bureaucratic rationality. The nondelegation doctrine
seeks to preserve exogenous goal creation. 14 The list of the grounds for
judicial reversal of agency judgment in the APA,15 and the actual practices of
most reviewing courts,16 are for the most part celebrations of the law's
13. Jay Galbraith, Designing Complex Organizations (Reading, Mass.: Addison-Wesley, 1973).
14. See, e.g., Industrial Union Dept., AFL-CIO v. American Petroleum Inst., 448 U.S. 607, 671
(1980) (concurring opinion of Justice Rehnquist).
15: 5 U.S.C. § 706.
16. Colin S. Diver, Policymaking Paradigms in Administrative Law, 95 Harv. L. Rev. 393
(1981).
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demand for means-end rationality in administration. Overtly "political"
administrative action is suppressed. 17 Agencies are encouraged, and some-
times required, to develop general rules to guide their personnel,18 even
where lack of particularity might produce some substantive injustice."19
Deference is paid to agency expertise, and the division of labor that fosters
expertness is recognized in the "collegial" decision-formally the decision of
the hierarchical superior but substantively the work of specialized sta££.20
The pure spoils system for choosing officials has run afoul of the due process
clause's substantive prohibitions,21 while that provision's procedural re-
quirements foster,22 even while not directly ensuring,25 security of bureau-
cratic tenure.
Now consider the contending vision of organizations. I call this view
"micropolitical," perhaps under the influence of Graham Allison's famous
Type-III model of governmental decision-making.24 Others use terms such
as "environmental"25 or "open"26 to try to capture a series of insights that
tend to contradict the basic elements of the Weberian rational-bureaucratic
model. In this view, organizations have complex goals and competing
internal and external constituencies. Formal authority is largely unrelated to
real authority within the organization. Organizations are the tools of some
set of internal or external masters, not the neutral implementors of pre-
selected programs!At the very least the organization has an internal and an
extern.d environment to which it must adapt. Actions are often "ruleless"
responses to these conflicting internal and external pressures.
This vision of administration is recognized and fostered by a different set
of administrative law doctrines and/or practices. The nondelegation doc-
trin.e, as everyone knows, is honored mostly in the breach.27 Gaps or incon-
sistencies in agency rationalizations are not necessarily invalidating,28 and
the possibility that the revealed reasons have little relationship to the actual
decision process can be'inquired into only in exceptional circumstances.29
Agencies do not have to exercise their rule-making power to produce
comprehensive, rational solutions if they would prefer to act in a contextual,
17. See, e.g., D.C. Federation of Civic Ass'ns v. Volpe, 459 F.2d 1231 (D.C. Gir.), cert. denied, 405
U.S. 1030 (1972). .
18. See, e.g., Nat'l Petroleum Refiners Ass'n v. FTC, 482 F.2d 672 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 415
U.S. 951 (1974).
19. See, e.g., United States v. Florida East Coast Ry. 0:>., 410 U.S. 224 (1973).
20. Morgan v. United States (Morgan II), 304 U.S. 1, 17-18 (1938).
21. Elrod v. Bums, 427 U.S. 347 (1976).
22. Perry v. Sinderman, 408 U.S. 593 (1972).
23. Board of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 504 (1972).
24. Graham T. Allison, Essence of Decision (Boston: Little, Brown, 1971).
25. Perrow, supra note 7.
26. Scott, supra note 7.
27. See, e.g., Jerry L. Mashaw & Richard A. Merrill, Introduction to the American Public Law
System 191-94 (St. Paul, Minn.: West Publishing Co., 1975).
28. See, e.g., Automotive Parts and Accessories Ass'n v. Boyd, 407 F.2d 330 (D.C. Gir. 1968).
29. United States v. Morgan (Morgan IV), 313 U.S. 409 (1941).
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case-by-case fashion. so Prohibitions on ex parte contacts need not inhibit the
free flow of executive and congressional political advice.S} Outsiders with
stakes in bureau decisions have and may make claims on agency attention to
values far removed from its basic mandate and conventional expertise.s2 The
President need not retain high-ranking bureaucrats in whom he does not
have confidence,ss and bureaucratic tenure is, at base, a function of specific
statutory or contract provisions.s4
The Lesson to Be Learned
The relationship between organization theory and administrative law-
what I have described as their "mirrored ambivalence"-might be captured,
of course, by any number of alternative conceptions. I make no claim to have
been wholly fair to either field and my account is obviously incomplete. But,
if the vision that I have propounded is in some sense correct, what lesson
should we draw from it? And what might that lesson suggest about the status
of the relationship between organization theory and administrative law?
I can certainly imagine a cheerful answer. Organization theorists, while
earlier providing the Weberian ideal, are now telling us to remember as we
pursue it, that bureaucracy is not all, cannot be all, rational implementation.
Designing administrative structures that function acceptably is a much more
complex and contingent business than setting out a coherent organization
chart. Administrative law has independently (and usually implicitly) recog-
nized the wisdom of this teaching. Legal doctrine mediates pursuit of the
Weberian ideal by devices and doctrines that take into account the comprom-
ises of political life and the intractable nature of the human materials. Such
is the learning of the organization theorists and the wisdom of the lawyers.
Although not formally united we are living together both happily and
successfully.
But I am not so sure. The notions, (1) that the good is contingent and (2)
that local judgment may be informed while global theories are ignorant, do
not so comfort me that I can reject a contrary hypothesis. Perhaps neither
they (organization theorists) nor we (administrative lawyers) know what we
are talking about. That the world still works would then be a testament, not
to our learning and wisdom, but to our irrelevance. And, if that is the
self-knowledge that we offer each other, I predict an early dissolution of the
relationship. Neither we nor they are about to fold up shop, and hence,we
would be better off going our separate ways.
30. NLRB v. Bell Aerospace Co., Division of Textron, Inc., 416 U.S. 267 (1974).
31. See, e.g., Action for Children's Television v. FCC, 564 F.2d 458 (D.C. Cir. 1977); Katherine
Gibbs Schools v. FTC 612 F.2d 658 (2d Cir. 1979); Office of Legal Counsel, Department and
Justice, Memorandum to the Secretary of Interior, reproduced in part in Jerry L. Mashaw &
Richard A. Merrill, 1980 Supplement to Introduction to the American Public Law System
49-50 (1980).
32. See, e.g., Calvert Cliffs' Coord. Comm. v. AEC, 449 F.2d 1109 (D.C. Cir. 1971).
33. As my one-time colleague Carl MacFarland delighted in saying, "The Lesson of Hum-
phrey's Executor v. United States [(295 U.S. 602 (1935)] is in the title."
34. Bishop v. Wood, 42'6 U.S. 341 (1976).
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There is, as always, a middle way. Neither organization theorists nor
administrative lawyers are very happy with the current state of their under-
standing. Neither of us really wants to say "it all depends" and then provide
a shifting list of variables having uncertain weights and relationships to
,each other as our explanation of what it (how organizations will behave or
how institutions should be .designed) depends on.35 And neither of us really
has much prospect of clearing up our messy theory or our messy doctrine
with a single stroke. We will, therefore, continue to confront each other with
occasional insights, and occasional insults. We will sometimes wonder
whether it is worthwile listening to each other. Yet as we labor in what Dick
Stewart once described as a "dense complexity,"36 it is nice to know that we
are not alone.
35. For a recent instructive attempt to do better see Henry Mintzberg, The Structuring of'
Organizations (Englewood Cliffs, N.].: Prentice-Hall, 1979).
36. Richard B. Stewart, The Reformation of American Administrative Law, 88 Harv. L. Rev.
1667, 1813 (1975).
